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The Origin of Aristotle's Metaphysical Aporiae
Edward Halper 
University of Georgia
That the fifteen aporiae^ to whose exposition Aristotle devotes all of Metaphysics B 
originate from Platonism is widely accepted. However, the text provides no account of 
how Aristotle constructed these aporiae, and the exact path by which they developed re­
mains shrouded by our lack of knowledge of Aristotle's contemporaries and of the discus­
sions in Plato's Academy. Book B has been a focal point for various, conflicting accounts 
of Aristotle's development, for scholars assume that the aporiae presented here are prob- 
lems that troubled Aristotle and remained unsolved when he wrote Metaphysics B. In 
this paper I shall present an alternative account of the origin of Aristotle's aporiae. Re- 
gretably, my treatment can claim no greater textual authority than other treatments: in 
all likelihood the details of the origin will always be a matter of speculation. However, 
it seems to me to be a worthwhile subject for speculation for two reasons. First, most 
discussions of the aporiae take them to be more or less arbitrary: they express problems 
that happened to disturb Aristotle at the point in his career when he wrote book B, 
problems that arise from objections that happened to be raised against Platonism or 
against Aristotle's own early philosophy, problems that (if G.E.L. Owen is right) ultimately 
result from the clash of observed facts with the opinions that happened to be held in
O
common by a particular linguistic community. But Aristotle regards aporiae as intrinsic
1. Aristotle lists the aporiae in B 1, and he discusses each in detail in B 2-6. K 1-2
contain a briefer exposition. The order and number of aporiae differ slightly in the three
presentations. My numbering follows B 2-6, the fullest discussion. The fourth and fifth  
aporiae of B 2-6 appear in B 1 as the fifth and fourth aporiae, respectively. W.D. Ross, 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, I (Oxford, 1924), 226, uses the numbering of B 1. He counts four- 
teen aporiae because he does not number 1002b12-32, a problem he takes as akin to the 
ninth and fourth (his fifth) aporiae, I, 249. I take it to be a distinct aporia. G. Reale,
The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ed. and 
trans. J.R. CâTèm (Albâny, Ι9/ν;, pp. '66=:83, aisd—tdttöws the numbering of B 2-6.
2. W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, trans. R.
Robinson, 2nd ed."(Iôfïdon, 1967), p. 196, claims that most of the aporiae 'arise out of
the crisis in Plato's doctrine, and consist in efforts to rehabilitate the assertion of su­
persensible reality.* He thinks that the objections disturbed Aristotle because he was still 
a Platonist when he wrote book B. On the other hand, G.E.L. Owen, 'Logic and Meta­
physics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,' in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth 
Century, eds. I. Duering and G.E.L. Owen, (Goeteborg, 19BÜ), p. 178, contends that the 
aporiae signal Aristotle's return to Platonism. Speaking of the first few aporiae, he 
claims that the 'conclusions of the Analytics reappgac, in the Metaphysics as problems 
which must be resolved if any generál sciénce of to ον is to be possible.'
3. 'Tithenai ta Phainomena,* in Aristote et les problèmes de méthode, ed. S. Mansion 
(Louvain, 1961), pp. 83-103. Martha Nurs&äum- denies that TfTe facts "play any role in the 
generation of the aporiae, 'Saving Aristotle's Appearances,* in Language and Logos: Studies 
in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L. Owen, eds. Malcolm Schofield and Martha 
Craven Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 267-93. She maintains that they arise only from 
conflicts in common opinions. Her criticism of Owen is justified, but the consequence of 
her view is that the aporiae are even more arbitrary. They would depend entirely on the 
opinions held by the particular community of which Aristotle happened to find himself a 
part.
2.
constituents of any science, and we would expect the particular metaphysical aporiae of 
book B to be inherent in the subject matter of the science of metaphysics. That this is 
so seems to be part of what induces Aristotle to insist (in the opening lines of book B) on 
the necessity of going through the aporiae for making progress in metaphysics (995a24- 
25). Part of the reason that contemporary scholars take the aporiae to be subjective and 
arbitrary is the difficulty of understanding how Aristotle could have thought problems with 
Platonism and Presocratic philosophy necessary constituents of metaphysics. In providing 
an alternative, I hope to undercut the motivation for Owen's view and for developmental 
views.
A second reason for speculating on the origin of the metaphysical aporiae is that it 
affords us insight into the problems Aristotle presents in book B and addresses elsewhere 
in the Metaphysics. Aristotle's point that we need to understand the problems before we 
can grasp the solutions is a truism too little heeded by scholars. The analysis of the or­
igin of the aporiae that I shall propose here throws the Metaphysics into a somewhat 
unusual light. Thus, even though my interpretation is no less speculative than any other 
analysis, it has advantages for our understanding of the Metaphysics and of the discipline 
it treats.
I
The paradigm of the procedure that I think Aristotle uses to generate the aporiae 
appears in the first book of the Physics. There (A 2, 185a20-b25), he undertakes an as­
sessment of the Eleatic claim that all is one. However, before he can determine its 
truth, he needs to decide what it could mean. The problem is that one is said in many 
ways. Aristotle mentions (1) the continuous, (2) the indivisible, and (3) the one in formula 
as types of one that the Eleatics could have had in mind (b7-9). (Metaphysics A 6 and I 
1 contain richer descriptions of the things that are called one.) To refute the Eleatic 
thesis, Aristotle needs to refute each of the three possible interpretations: all is con­
tinuous, all is indivisible, and all is one in formula and essence. This turns out to be 
fairly easy. None of the interpretations makes the claim plausible. After brief argu­
ments against each interpretation (b9-25), the Physics proceeds to consider other accounts 
of principles.
What is particularly interesting about Aristotle's treatment of the Eleatics is his need 
to translate their claim about the one into his more refined distinctions of types of one. 
Once Aristotle has distinguished a plurality of ones, it remains ambiguous for the Eleatics, 
or anyone else, to speak simply of the one. Aristotle must interpret their claims in 
terms of his own distinctions. This done, the claim is easily dismissed. We can imagine 
a slightly different outcome. Suppose that two or more incompatible translations of the
claim had been right, or suppose that all are wrong But we have sortie independent ground
for believing in the truth of the claim. What could we do? Wè would be at a loss,
blocked from progress; we would be in aporia. In this paper I shall show how just this
sort of difficulty could give rise to many of the aporiae of book B.
The metaphysical aporiae differ from the critique of the Eleatics in that they are 
aimed primarily at Platonism. For some reason scholars concerned with Aristotle's crit­
icism of Plato have tended to focus on the arguments against the forms being separate 
from sensibles. An at least as important strand of Aristotle's attack is his arguments 
about the unity ascribed to form by Plato and his followers. That Aristotle recognizes 
unity as a character of Plato's forms is clear: he often describes the Platonic form as a 
"one over many" (e.g. A 9, 990b6-8, b13-14, 991a1-2). In one passage he claims that the 
Platonists "provide the forms as the essence of each of the other things, and one as the 
essence of the forms" (A 7, 988b4-6; 6, 988a10-11). In other words, it is unity that makes 
the Platonic form be what it is. But one is said in many ways. Which type of one did 
"Plato" intend to ascribe to the forms? A central and recurring Aristotelian criticism of 
Plato's position is that Plato ascribes two inconsistent types of unity to form.
This criticism occurs in various places in the Metaphysics and in several different 
formulations. In the critique of the forms contained in A 9, Aristotle writes of the Pla­
tonists,
. . .  it is clear that if there is some one itself and this is a principle, one 
is being said in many ways; for otherwise [what they say] is impossible 
(992a8-9).
The problem, described earlier in the passage, is that the Platonists speak of the one as a 
character of a number while also recognizing that the number is composed of units 
(992a1-9): they make the one both a part and the character of the whole. In other 
words, the Platonists who spoke of a one itself took it to be both an indivisible part and 
the character of a whole.
In M 8 Aristotle elaborates on what I take to be the same or nearly the same crit­
icism (1084b2-32). He accuses the Platonists of making one a principle in two ways:
How is one a principle? They say [that it is a principle] because it is not 
divisible. But both the universal and the particular or element are indi­
visible. However, [they are indivisible] in different ways, the first in 
respect of formula, the second in respect of time (1084bi3-16).
The idea of a principle that is indivisible in time has troubled commentators,^ but the
4. Ross, II, 452, claims that an opposition between indivisibility in formula and in time 
would be unparalleled in Aristotle. He proposes instead to read the text as saying that 
the two ones are principles in different ways, the one in definition and the other in 
time. J. Annas, Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books M and N (Oxford, 1976), p. 18.3, accepts 
his reasoning and"5jy5%kS"‘<5f án ellipsis in the text. ..But the passage claims that the Pla­
tonists made one tne principle because it is indivisible. To speak of the principle as prior
4Metaphysics defines continuity as a character of what has a motion that is indivisible in 
time (Δ 6, 1016a5-6). So Aristotle's point is that the Platonists made the principle one in 
formula (or universal) and also one by continuity (the concrete unit)/* That is to say, the 
Platonic form is supposed to be one in both ways. The problem is that a single principle 
seems unable to have these two kinds of unity (b18-20, b32).
Along the same lines is Aristotle's suggestion that the Platonists made the forms 
both one in number and one in species, thereby ascribing two apparently incompatible 
types of one to them (Z 14, 1039a26-b6). And this latter is closely connected with 
Aristotle's accusations that Plato's forms are individuals (Z 15, 1040a8-9) and universals 
(e.g. 16, 1040b27-30).
[There is no need to raise the standard questions about the accuracy of these crit­
icisms, or the question whether Aristotle refers to the dialogues or to some esoteric 
.Platonic doctrines. As long as our concern is with interpreting Aristotle, we should be 
content to recognize what he - rightly or wrongly - understood Platonism to be.]
These criticisms of Platonism are constructed along the same lines as Aristotle's 
criticism of the Eleatics. Aristotle begins from a central Platonic principle, the unity of 
form, and translates it into his own more refined unity language. He then proceeds to 
criticize the plurality of different, and in Plato's case, incompatible translations.
My contention is that the aporiae presented to us in book B were the result of a 
very similar procedure. The dichotomies inherent in these aporiae represent alternative 
translations of the Platonic principle that form is one. In each case aporia results 
because two translations are equally well (or equally poorly supported). Form seems to be 
one in a variety of different and incompatible ways. Yet, interestingly, Aristotle insists 
on the truth of the Platonic claim. Unless Aristotle is assuming that form must be one, 
the aporiae are not at all problematic. There seems to be an important kernel of truth 
to Platonism. Aristotle's problem in book B is to explain where it does not lie; that is, 
to explain why all attempts to translate the Platonic claim into more refined unity lan­
guage fail to yield a single translation. It is my aim in this paper to trace a number of 
the aporiae to this source. I shall also have something to say about the ultimately more 
important question of why Aristotle accepts the truth of the unity claim.
in time or formula would be irrelevant to this discussion. If the principle is a principle 
because it is one, then its priority as a principle ought to result from its unity.
5. It might be objected: how can the unit be indivisible in time? But part of the crit­
icism is that the Platonists made numbers concrete; thpy made them ousiae. Further, 
Aristotle criticizes them for treating the unit as matter. Other examples such as an 
acute angle show that the motivation for making a unit the principle is just this indi­
visibility in time.
There is one aporia among the fifteen that is obviously a question about which kind 
of unity that ought to be ascribed. The ninth aporia (999b24-1000a4) asks whether the 
principles are one in species or one in number. Since specific unity is, by definition, 
unity in formula (Δ 6, 1016b31-33), this question amounts to asking which of the two al­
ternative ones mentioned in M 8 most properly belongs to principles. Both are types of 
unity that Aristotle thinks Plato attributes to his principles, the forms, and there is no 
doubt from Aristotle's discussion that Plato is the object of his criticism. The details of 
Aristotle's argument are somewhat technical, but looking at his presentation of the ninth 
aporia will help us to see that the sixth, seventh and eighth aporiae are closely related 
and how all turn on the problem of unity.
As I said, the ninth aporia asks whether the principles are one in number or one in 
species. The discussion contains arguments against either alternative. Against the view 
that a principle is one in species is the problem that nothing would be one in number 
(999b25-26). In other words, if the principles were only one in formula, they could not 
explain why there are things that are numerically one; they could not account for indi­
viduals. As an indication of how serious this consequence would be for Platonists,
Aristotle notes that not even the one itself or being itself would be numerically one
(b26).
A second, less clear consequence of the principles being specifically one is that 
there would be no knowledge because knowledge requires a "one over many* (b26-27). 
Aristotle's reasoning here is problematic because the one through which we know the many 
should be the species; we know many things by grasping the species that they share.
Were a principle one in species but not one in number, there should, it would seem, be no 
obstacle to knowledge. Could Aristotle be claiming that the species must be numerically 
one in order to be known?** More likely, Aristotle's point here builds on the first con­
sequence: without a principle that is numerically one, there will be nothing that is 
numerically one nor, consequently, can there be many things. But without a many, there 
can be no one over many, and so no knowledge.^ On this interpretation, the principle is
6. Ross, I, 242, thinks that Aristotle raises only one objection to the principles being one 
in species, how can there be knowledge of sensibles without something that is numerically 
one that they share in common. He does not explain why something specifically one 
would not suffice for knowledge.
7. This seems to be Joseph Owens' interpretation. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristo­
telian 'Metaphysics,' 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1963), p. 246. He thinks theft Aristofte” denies that 
tfrF (Plâtôrtic) fôfffis are knowable because scientific knowledge requires a specific unity 
in singulars." It is inaccurate for Owens to sav that principles which were one in species 
woDtd be Platonic forms; for, as we saw, the Platonic forms have both characters.
a principle of knowledge; but, because it lacks numeric unity, it is unable to be a prin­
ciple of the existence of individuals.
On the other side, there is Aristotle's argument against the principles being one in 
number. Suppose that the principles were numerically one. Then how would there be 
anything else besides the elements? (999b31-33). It would make no sense to speak of 
two instances of one principle; each thing would be an individual. Further, there could be 
no composites because the parts would each be numerically one, and the whole could only 
be a plurality.
In short, the problem with ascribing either type of unity to principles is that neither 
can account for things that have the other character. It seems that a principle should 
have both types of unity in order to be the principle of things with both types of unity.
Of course, Aristotle could dispense with the whole question by simply denying that a prin­
ciple must be one. Conversely, the ninth aporia is problematic only because Aristotle 
does insist that a principle must be one.
The ninth aporia seems to be the result of translating the Platonic idea that form is 
one into Aristotle's unity language. Since the form is a principle, Plato could be insisting 
on the unity of form to say that a principle is numerically one or to say that a principle 
is specifically one. Aristotle's discussion of the ninth aporia shows that neither unity by 
itself is acceptable. And as they are usually understood, the two types of one are in­
compatible.
Aristotle's discussion of ninth aporia also indicates how to perform a second trans­
lation. He explains.
For to say one in number or individual (καθ' έκαστον) makes no difference; 
for we say one in number just as we say individual, and the universal is over 
these (999b33-1 OOOal).
If we follow these equations, we should be able to reformulate the ninth aporia as the 
problem of whether the principles are individual or universal. This latter is actually one 
of the aporiae (the fifteenth - 6, 1003a6-17). So translation of claims about one seems to 
be two step process: first, Aristotle decides which type of unity is at issue and formulates 
the claim in terms of his own unity determinations; then, he further translates some of 
these claims into distinctively Aristqtelian terms, universal and individual.
This second translation, however, is of a different sort than the first. In general, to 
speak of something as one in some respect is to indicate a characteristic, while to speak 
of a thing as a universal or an individual is to indicate its kind. The universal is a 'one 
over many' (Z 13, 1038b11-12; De Intp. 7, 17a39-40), (jut the ‘one* in this definition is a 
formula that all instances of the universal share. So each instance of the universal is 
also one in formula. Thus, Socrates is one in formula because his essence can be exprès-
sed (at least partially) by a single formula, a formula that he happens to share with 
others. Socrates is, of course, one in number as well. Indeed, whatever is one in number 
is also one in species (Δ 6, 1016b35-1017a3). In contrast, an individual is never universal. 
Accordingly, we can translate "one in formula" into "universal" when we are characterizing 
something that is one in formula but not one in number (in the sense that the presence 
of matter makes something one in number); such as when we are speaking of the species 
man. Often we can translate a claim about something that is numerically one into a 
claim about an individual. But, as we can see, these translations will not always work.
A reflection of the difference between the two types of terms is that the fifteenth 
aporia turns on a slightly different issue than the ninth. The former argues that if the 
principles were universal, no ousiae would exist because an ousia is not common, like the 
universal, but a "this something and one’ (1003a7-12). On the other hand, if the prin­
ciples were individuals, it argues, there would be no knowledge (1003a13-14). In contrast, 
the ninth aporia mentions the impossibility of knowledge as a consequence not of the 
principles being numerically one, as we would expect if it were parallel to the fifteenth, 
but of the principles being one in species. Further, the fifteenth aporia is addressed in M 
10 with no reference to the ninth.
The ninth and the fifteen aporiae are, then, different. But they both stem from a 
common source, the Platonic claim about thé unity of form. Both aporiae represent 
translations of the Platonic assumption into Aristotelian terms.
The ninth aporia presumes that there are only two choices for the translation of 
"one," one in number and one in species. Are there not other possible translations? 
Aristotle catalogues a variety of different type of one in Δ 6 and I 1. Are not each of 
these possibilities for the unity that belongs to a principle? In fact, earlier aporiae do 
raise other possibilities. However, unlike the ninth which is clearly a problem about the 
unity of a principle, it is less apparent that the unity of the principle is at issue in the 
other aporiae. The sixth, seventh, and eighth aporiae all arise from an issue that is 
similar to that of the ninth, but we need to examine Aristotle's arguments to see this.
This sixth aporia asks whether the principles and elements of a thing are its genera 
or the constituents into which it is divided, such as the letters into which speech is 
divided (3, 998a20-25). Against the genera being principles and thus for the material con­
stituents being principles, Aristotle points out that the parts of which a body is con­
structed are its principles and that we know the nature of a thing like a bed when we 
know its parts and the way that they are put together (998a24-b3).
8. As we might expect, there are some notable exceptions to the rule that "universal" 
refers to a kind; e.g. the description of metaphysics as universal because primary (E 1, 
1026a29-31).
8In support of the other side, that genera are principles, Aristotle notes that we know 
each thing by its definition and the genera are the principles of definitions (998b4-6). 
Further, some of those who make one, being, and so forth, principles treat them as 
genera (b9-11).
These arguments scarcely mention unity, but the assumption that the principle must 
be one motivates the aporia. Why else should we suppose that the principle is either a 
material constituent or a generic constituent? Each seems to be a principle because 
Aristotle assumes that the principle is one and each of these is a kind of one. The 
material constituent is an element of a body and the genus is an element of a formula. 
And, as we learn from Aristotle's discussion of element in Δ 3, an element is an indi­
visible constituent (1014b26-27). While the term belongs most properly to material con­
stituents, it is transferred from them to anything that is one (= simple or indivisible) and 
small (1014b3-5). For this reason genera are called elements (b9-12). [Also, Aristotle 
mentions the generic substrate and the material substrate as kinds of one in Δ 6 
(1016a17-32).] In short, the elements seem to be principles because, as indivisible con­
stituents, they are one. But there are two kinds of elements, generic and material, and 
Aristotle provides reasons to think that things with each type of unity are most properly 
principles. The aporia arises from the attempt to decide which type of unity belongs 
most properly to principles.
Some indication that this is indeed the origin of this aporia comes from an argument 
against a principle's being both a genus and a material constituent that Aristotle appends 
to the arguments of the sixth aporia:
But neither is it possible to describe the principles in both ways. For the 
formula of the ousia is one; and the definition through the genera will differ 
from that definition which states the constituents of which it is composed 
(998 bl 1-14).
Q
This argument may, as Ross thinks, deny that both genera and material elements could 
be principles of a thing: were they both principles, two distinct formulae would express 
the essence. This interpretation assumes that to "describe the principles in both ways" is 
to ascribe two distinct principles to a thing. It is more plausible to interpret the con­
clusion of the argument as denying that the same thing could be a principle in both 
ways. And Aristotle's reasoning readily supports this conclusion: since the definition that 
states the genus differs from the definition that includes the material elements (and since 
there is just one definition), the same thing cannot be both a generic constituent and a 
material element. Further, this latter interpretation pf the argument is most pertinent 
here because, as we saw in the discussion of M 8, the Platonists apparently try to make
9. I, 233
the forms both genera and material constituents. Thus, the point of this argument is the 
same as the argument of M 8: the same thing cannot be a principle in both ways as the 
Platonists thought.
So understood, this last argument completes the sixth aporia. Aristotle advances ar­
guments for the principles having the unity of a generic constituent and also for the prin­
ciples having the unity of a material element, but the principles cannot have both types 
of unity.
Both genera and material constituents are one as elements. They are what M 8 
refers to as 'indivisible in respect of the particular' (1084b14-15). This type of unity is 
the most obvious of Aristotle's various ones. But the discussion of the aporia suggests 
that the similarity of generic and material elements masks a greater difference, that be­
tween a formula and a composite. The question raised in the sixth aporia is thus another 
formulation of the problem of the ninth aporia. Where the ninth asks about unity in for­
mula or number, the sixth asks about unity in generic or material element. At issue in 
both is whether the unity possessed by a principle is a unity that can be found in a 
composite or a unity of a formula. All of these ones are interpretations of the unity 
that Plato ascribes to principles. Thus, the sixth aporia also arises from an attempt to 
translate a Platonic claim into Aristotle's more refined unity language.
The seventh aporia examines different types of unity in formula. The genus is one 
in formula because it is an indivisible element of a formula. Aristotle also applies the 
expression 'one in formula" to what has an indivisible formula (Δ 6, 1016a32-35), and it is 
the latter sense that he has in mind in the ninth aporia. Species and many genera each 
have a single formula; the highest genera have no formula. Which type of unity in for­
mula ought to belong to principles? The seventh aporia raises what I take to be an 
equivalent question. It asks: are the principles the highest or lowest genera? (998b14- 
16). This question is only an aporia if, as Aristotle assumes here, "the genera are prin­
ciples most of all" (998b14). That is, the seventh aporia assumes at least a partial an­
swer to the sixth aporia. Only the genera are still under consideration. The ostensible 
problem is whether the most universal genus is the principle or the genus that is predi­
cated directly of individuals, the species.
Part of Aristotle's support for denying that the highest genera are principles is the 
argument that neither being nor one can be genera. The problem is that because they 
belong to everything, nothing can stand outside of them and differentiate them. (A genus 
cannot belong to its differentia.) Hence, they cannot be genera (998b22-27). If being and 
one are not genera, then they also cannot be principles if the genera are principles (b27- 
28).
A second argument goes as follows: If what is most universal is not a principle, the
genera that are principles could only be what are less universal. But then there would be 
an indefinite number of principles (since there are an indefinite number of genera) 
(998b28-31).
In the two foregoing arguments against the highest genera being principles, Aristotle 
does not explicitly say that the principle must be one, but this assumption makes the ar­
guments more intelligible. If we agree that a principle must be one, then we have good 
reason to think that one or being should be the highest principle. Each seems to be a 
single principle that stands over all things. Likewise, the discovery that the higher 
genera are an indefinite plurality is clearly an objection to their being principles we 
assume that the principle must be one.
Aristotle is explicit about the unity assumption in his third argument against higher 
genera being principles. He reasons:
But if one is more of the nature of a principle, and the indivisible is one,
. . ., the last predicate would be more one (999a1-5).
The lowest genus, i.e. the species, seems to be more one and thus more of a principle 
than other genera, for it alone cannot be divided into other genera. Since unity is a 
criterion of principles, the lowest genus has more of a claim to be called a principle.
In support of the higher genera being principles, Aristotle claims that they seem to
possess another character of principles to a greater degree than the lower genera: they
10are more separable from individuals than the lower genera (999a17-23). As it is for­
mulated in book B, the seventh aporia turns on whether unity or apartness is a more 
important criterion of a principle. The source of the aporia is the assumption that a 
principle should have both characteristics along with the realization that each seems to 
belong where the other is absent. The higher genera are more apart from individuals; the 
lower genera are more one.
It is obvious that the issue in this aporia is how the principles can be one, but unity 
plays a role in both alternatives. Apartness is closely tied to unity here and throughout 
the Metaphysics. To be apart is to be independent. Something that depends on another 
thing is less one that what is independent. Clearly, what is one is apart or separate and 
what is apart or separate is more one than what is not apart. This is why the higher 
genera seem to be more apart than the lower genera: they are more universal (999a21- 
22). Each genus is a *one over many"; the higher genera are more one, and so more 
apart. What is farthest from particulars seems to be most one. What could be more one 
than what is common to all, the one itself and its twin, being itself? Thus, if the unity
10. Here and in the discussion of the next aporia Aristotle usually expresses this idea with 
the with the preposition παρά. At 999a19 he uses a form of the verb separate (χωρίζω) 
equivalently. I shall use "apart* and "separate" indifferently in this discussion.
that belongs to a principle is the unity of what is apart, the higher genera would seem to 
be principles.
The conflict in the seventh aporia is once again the problem of deciding which of 
two types of unity belong most properly to the principles. Is the principle one in being 
indivisible or is it one because it can exist separately? Again, the aporia arises because 
there are two inconsistent and seemingly well supported interpretations of the Platonic 
notion that a principle is one.
The eighth aporia is ostensibly a question about the separation of the principles, but 
if we look at the reasoning on both sides, we can see that the real issue is still how the 
principles can be one. Is there anything that exists apart from particulars?, the eighth 
aporia asks (999a24-b24). A reason to answer yes is that there must be a one that is 
universal if there is to be knowledge of individuals (999a28-31). In other words, the 
reason that there ought to be something apart is that the principle of knowledge is one. 
On the other hand, the insistence that the principle be one also generates an argument
against the principles being apart: if there were one ousia apart from the individuals, then
everything of which it was the ousia would be one, “for all are one of which the ousia is 
one" (999b18-23). Here Aristotle assumes that the ousia of a thing is its principle and 
then points out the absurdity of there being a single ousia for a plurality of things. In 
short, what looks at first glance like a consideration of the apartness of a principle is 
really a question about how it can be one. The principle must be one for there to be 
knowledge; but it cannot be one without everything else of which it is the principle being 
one. Aristotle's arguments for and against apartness are arguments for and against unity. 
The unity at issue here is clearly unity in species (or unity in formula). The principle 
must possess this type of unity to be a principle of knowledge. However, what is one in
this way is the universal, and the universal cannot be the ousia of its instances (cf. Z 13,
1038b14-15; 16, 1040b17).^ Like the others, this aporia is also a problem about the 
unity of principles.
So formulated, the eighth aporia leads directly to the ninth, discussed earlier. While 
the eighth considers whether or not principles are one in species, the ninth inquires 
whether they are one in species or one in number. Indeed, aporiae six through nine seem 
to constitute a carefully constructed sequence. The issue in the sixth is between two 
types of material unity, elements. Aristotle points out that the genus is not really an 
element at all, and then asks about the genera in the seventh aporia. Considering (in the
11. M.J. Woods, Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13," in Aristotle: A Collection of . 
Critical Essays, ed. J.M.E. MoTéfVCSik (Nôtre Dame. 1967), pp. 215-238, maintains that the 
passage from Z 13 does not argue against species being ousiae. The argument from B 4 
(999b18-23) under discussion here appears to be identical to that of Z 13, and it clearly 
does deny that the species is an ousia.
seventh aporia) whether unity or apartness is a more important criterion of principles 
leads Aristotle to examine (in the eighth aporia) whether the criterion of apartness can be 
met at all. As we saw, the question of whether the principles can be apart turns on the 
question of whether they can be one in species. Thus, the ninth aporia merely makes 
explicit the issue before us since the sixth aporia, are the principles one in species or one 
in number?
By this point there should be no question that the assumption that a principle is one 
plays a prominent role in aporiae six through nine. Aristotle refers to this assumption 
explicitly. My contention that this assumption is the source of the aporiae draws support 
from the insight that it provides into the details of the arguments of particular aporiae 
and from the organization of these aporiae into a coherent sequence that it suggests.
Like aporiae six-nine, the tenth through the fifteenth aporiae are also concerned 
with principles. But Aristotle's interest here is specifically the first principles. Three of 
these aporiae inquire about the first principles posited by other philosophers: being and 
one (aporia 11), mathematical (aporia 12), and forms (aporia 13). (These principles are all 
posited by Platonists, among others.) The reason for thinking each of these is the first 
principle is that each is one. Aristotle's argument in favor of the one itself being the 
first principle is that without it no universal would be separate nor would any number be 
separate (1001 a l9-27). Stated positively, this amounts to saying that the one itself is the 
principle of universais and of number. Since it can have these functions only by virtue of 
its unity, it must be through its unity that the one itself has a claim to be the first 
principle. Part of the motivation for thinking that mathematicals are the first principles 
is that they are the least constituent parts of bodies without which the bodies could not 
be (1002a6-8). The body is less of a first principle that the plane, and the line less of a 
principle than the point (1002a4-6). In other words, the mathematicals also seem to be 
principles because they are one, and those mathematicals that are most indivisible are the
highest principles. Finally, Aristotle claims that the existence of the forms is supported
by the need for a unity possessed by a plurality (6, 1002b23-25, 30-32). There is, then, 
some reason for thinking that other philosophers are right to posit these three as first 
principles because they are each one. On the other hand, in each case there are prob­
lems with ascribing the pertinent type of unity to the first principle. As I mentioned 
earlier, the final aporia, the question whether the principles are universal or individual, 
arises from a further translation of two types of one, unity in species and unity in 
number. This final aporia also assumes that the, principle must be one in some way.
The tenth aporia also depends on questions about unity. It asks whether changing
and unchanging things have the same principles. The problem here is whether these prin­
ciples of changing and unchanging things are one or many in genus, though this fact is
not really clear from the discussion the aporia receives in book B.
Of the aporiae about principles, only the fourteenth does not directly involve a prob­
lem about unity, it asks whether the principles are potential or actual. These latter are 
peculiarly Aristotelian terms, and it would not be surprising if they have little or no 
relation to unity. The issue, as it is formulated in book B, does not depend on a problem 
of unity. However, when Aristotle discusses the actuality of the principles in book Z, he 
does, in fact, connect the topic with a problem about unity (Z 13, 1039a4-6); but there is 
no need to go into that analysis here.
In sum, it should now be clear that most of the aporiae about principles, aporiae six 
through fifteen, concern the unity of principles. The issue in the sixth through ninth 
aporiae is what sort of unity the principle has, and the issue in the aporiae that follow is 
often whether something with a particular sort of unity ought to be called the first prin­
ciple. Aporiae six through nine could arise directly from the interpretation of the 
Platonic claim that form is one. Many of the other aporiae from this group also concern 
the kind of unity possessed by principles posited by Platonists.
Ill
The first five aporiae fall into a different group. The first four of these clearly 
follow the same pattern: they all ask whether one or many sciences treat a particular 
topic. Since they also assume that one science treats one genus, they all turn on the 
question of whether the topic in question belongs to a single genus. Thus, in the case of 
the first aporia, the problem of whether there is one or many sciences of the causes is 
the question of how the causes can be treated by one science given that they do not fall 
under a single genus. Although Aristotle does not say so, the one science must be meta­
physics. As the most universal science, metaphysics should include within its scope just 
the topics that are mentioned in the first four aporiae: (1) all the causes, (2) all the prin­
ciples of demonstration, (3) all the ousiae, and (4) all the per se attributes of ousiae.
How, though, can metaphysics treat these topics if they do not fall under one genus?
And how could the topics fall under one genus without the consequence being the exis­
tence of only a single science? The issue is just what sort of unity the subject matter 
of metaphysics possesses. It cannot have the unity of a strict genus, and yet it must 
have if it is to be a science.
The fifth aporia is slightly different, but it makes the same assumptions as the first 
four. While the first four ask whether there are one or many sciences of a topic and 
consider whether the topic can lie in one genus, the fifth asks whether there are one or 
many genera of ousiae (997a35-b3), and it considers whether there is a distinct science of 
mathematical intermediates. This is indirectly a question about the subject matter of
metaphysics: the Platonists posit the existence of intermediates that are known by math­
ematics in part for the sake of affirming that the forms alone are the subject of the 
highest knowledge.
In sum, the problem of the first group of aporiae is what sort of unity the subject 
matter of metaphysics possesses. This is usually a problem about how the topics the 
science should deal with can fall under the scope of one science. Except for the fifth  
aporia, the topics mentioned here are all peculiar to Aristotelian thought. Nevertheless, 
the aporiae have their source in the same Platonic claim that was such a rich source of 
the second group of aporiae, the claim that form is one. For Plato the forms are not 
only the principles of a science, they are the sole content of knowledge. Only the forms 
can be known. That is to say, the principles of a Platonic science and its subject matter 
are identical. The Platonic assertion about the unity of the form is, accordingly, also an 
assertion about the unity of the subject matter of a science. Aristotelian sciences are 
much richer: they not only know the principles, but are able to use them to demonstrate 
attributes belonging to the subject genus. The possibility of drawing inferences from prin­
ciples through syllogisms enables Aristotle to distinguish the unity of the subject matter 
from the unity of the principles. The Platonic assertion that form is one, thus falls 
immediately into two assertions: the subject matter of metaphysics is one, and the prin­
ciples of this science are one. Aristotle agrees that both must be one, but there is no 
reason that they need to be one in the same way. The two groups of aporiae arise when 
Aristotle examines the unity possessed by each.
There are, of course, other themes that run through the discussion of the aporiae, 
but by and large, it is Plato's claim that form is one that provides the basis of the 
aporiae. There are a variety of different interpretations of this claim. The aporiae arise 
because there is some reason to think that all of the interpretations are true.
It is the translation of Plato's claim into Aristotle's more refined terminology that 
generates the aporiae, but there is no reason to think that such a translation is neces­
sarily unfair to Plato. After all, once we recognize many different ones, assertions about 
an unspecified unity need to be translated. Moreover, if Plato really did hold the views 
that Aristotle apparently ascribes to him, the very identifications that so trouble Aristotle 
would be just what Plato might advance to support his view. The identification of 
subject matter and principles make Platonic sciences neat and clean; if the forms are 
both principles of definitions and constituents of bodies, all the better.
IV
As an account of the means by which Aristotle arrived at the fifteen aporiae that 
constitute Metaphysics B the foregoing is at (easj: as plausible as anything offered so far.
It has the advantage of tracing the aporiae to a Platonic assumption and thus of avoiding 
appeals to stages of Aristotle's development, common opinion, or the linguistic community 
in which Aristotle found himself. There is no reason to think that the aporiae express 
philosophical problems that are in any way personal or subjective. They arise from the 
attempt to make sense of Plato's assumption. The organization of the aporiae and the 
similarity of some of them to criticisms of Platonism suggest that Aristotle has a solution 
ready at hand.
The really interesting question that my account raises is why Aristotle should hold so 
tenaciously to the Platonic assumption about unity. The easy way out of the whole 
business would seem to be a denial that form is really one. He simply dismisses the 
Eleatic thesis. Why not dismiss Plato the same way?
The answer to this question, I suggest, is that problems that involve unity really are 
intrinsic to metaphysics, as Aristotle conceives it. There are indications of the impor­
tance of unity throughout book B; such as, the claims that one is more the nature of a 
principle (999a1-2) and that unity is a principle of knowledge (999a28-29). However, like 
so much else in the Metaphysics, really understanding what Aristotle means requires some 
reflection. Aristotle's science of metaphysics is the science of first principles and highest 
causes. Clearly, the highest cause cannot be composed of parts; for the parts would then
be prior to it, and it would no longer be the highest cause. The highest cause must be
incomposite: it must be one. The problem of finding the unity possessed by the highest 
principle is inherent in the task of metaphysics. Similarly, the question of the unity of 
the subject matter of metaphysics is also intrinsic to any metaphysics. As a science or 
discipline, metaphysics is one among others. Insofar as it is the highest science, it must 
somehow include the subject matter of the other sciences while still allowing a sphere for 
those other disciplines. Just what sort of unity could all things possess that would allow 
them to be known by a single science (metaphysics) and also be treated by other 
particular sciences? In sum, the problem of a science of highest principles is inherently a 
problem about the unity of the science and the unity of the principles.
Once we pose the problem in these terms, the position that Aristotle ascribes to 
Plato becomes a coherent and pertinent alternative. Plato's assertion that form is one 
amounts to the claim that the form is both the principle and the subject matter of know­
ledge. As I said, the simplicity and neatness of this view is a point in its favor.
Whether or not it was actually held by Plato it is clearly a view that Aristotle must con­
sider, and he must do so by examining distinctions that Plato collapses. Given the 
connection of problems of unity with metaphysics, the aporiae presented in book B do not 
express problems that happened to disturb Aristotle at some point in his career. Nor do 
they simply reflect objections raised to Platonism or to Aristotle's own earlier philosophy.
Even if Aristotle were entirely ignorant of Plato's works, the Metaphysics would still need 
to address the unity problems raised in the aporiae. They are problems that anyone who 
gives serious thought to the character of metaphysics as a discipline must confront.
To conclude, the aporiae originate when Aristotle attempts to make sense of a 
Platonic claim about the unity of form by translating it into his own more refined unity 
language. From a larger perspective, the problems about unity that we find in book B 
are problems inherent in a metaphysics of the sort Aristotle conceives.
